Russia’s external finance position significantly weakened in the first nine months of 2025, driven by declining energy revenues and increased import costs. The nation’s goods trade surplus narrowed to US$89.2 billion, falling substantially from US$100.5 billion recorded a year earlier. This decline in goods trade directly contributed to a sharp drop in the current-account surplus, which plummeted to US$30.1 billion from US$49.1 billion in the previous year. This deterioration highlights ongoing structural economic pressures linked to Western sanctions and the increasing difficulty of accessing non-sanctioned markets for both exports and imports.
The vulnerability of Russia’s commodity-export economy to acute supply-shock risks was immediately highlighted by a drone attack on the Novorossiysk port on the Black Sea. The attack forced a temporary halt of all oil exports from the major terminal, instantly raising global supply concerns and causing oil prices to jump by more than 2%. Novorossiysk is a crucial export hub for Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) crude, which is supplied primarily by Kazakhstan. While Kazakh shipments are typically exempt from EU sanctions, the disruption demonstrates how the war in Ukraine directly exposes global energy supply chains to geopolitical volatility.
These parallel developments underscore a major challenge for Moscow: even as the government tries to adapt its trade and financial mechanisms (e.g., increased use of the yuan), its primary source of income remains dangerously exposed to external disruptions and declining surpluses. The dwindling current-account surplus limits the government’s ability to fund its widening budget deficit and stabilize the ruble.
